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pose does not waive the service of process," but in the instant case,
no discussion of the service of process Is to be found. All that is to be
found in this connection is a rather vague discussion of the effect of the
respondent's special appearance. This is followed by a hasty, non
sequitur conclusion that the special appearance was of the same effect
as a general appearance, and in its decision (based on the general prop-
osition that when a defendant in a divorce action voluntarily submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by a general appearance, the
necessity for the service of process is obviated),12 the court concludes
that a valid decree was rendered by the Virginia court.
However, despite this faulty reasoning, it is submitted that a just
result was reached in this case, for the reason that there was a sufficient
service of process to give the Virginia court jurisdiction to grant a
divorce. A divorce action is considered quasi in rem, and consequently
the Virginia Code provides for service by publication on non-residents
in divorce actions. It has been held in Virginia that the real purpose
to be served by process is to apprise the adverse party of the nature of
the proceeding against him.1' There is also authority to the effect that
personal service outside the state of suit is equivalent to service by
publication.15 This being the law, it would seem that the Supreme
Court could have applied it to the facts of the instant case and could
in that way have reached a correct as well as just result. As the ques-
tion of domicil has been litigated and decided in favor of the husband,
and since the fault of the wife was established by the decree rendered
against her in the District of Columbia, Virginia has jurisdiction over
the res, and, therefore, authority to grant the divorce if the notice
statute has been complied with. Since the respondent here was per-
sonally served in the District of Columbia, both the provisions of the
publication statute and the policy of notice in the law have been com-
plied with, and the Virginia court had jurisdiction to grant the divorce.
PHLLIP ScOFF.
INSURANCE--"PARTICIPATING IN AERONAUTICS" IN AIRCRAFT
CLAUSE, AS APPLICABLE TO A PASSENGER.
The insured, a farmer, was killed in the crash of an airplane in
which he was a passenger. He had no control over the flight of the
plane, and was not connected with aeronautics in any business way.
The policy under which recovery for his death was sought provided:
" Bowers, Civil Process and Its Service, sec. 19, et seq. (1927).
"In re Austin's Estate, 173 Mich. 47, 138 N. W. 237 (1912); Free-
man v. Freeman, 126 App. Div. 601, 110 N. Y. S. 686 (1908). However,
the general rule is that there can be no waiver by appearance where
neither party is domiciled in the state of the forum. Cheever v. Wilson,
supra n. 3; Lister v. Lister, 88 N. J. Eq. 30, 97 Atl. 170. Some courts
refuse to recognize any voluntary appearance whatever: Gondas v.
Gondas, (N. 3. Eq.) 134 Atl. 615 (1926).
"Va. Code 1930, see. 6042.
2" Scott v. Scott, 142 Va. 31, 128 S. E. 599 (1925).Is Bowers, op. cit., sec. 295, 296.
CASE COMMENTS
"This policy does not cover death, disability, or other loss
received because of or while participating in aeronautics...."
Held, a passenger in an airplane is not "participating in aeronautics"
within the provision of the policy. Mutual Benefit Health and Accent
Ass'n v. Bowman, 99 F. (2d) 856, CCA 8th (1938).
The court's decision in this case was based upon definitions of
"participate" and "aeronautics". "Participate" is defined as "to take
part or have a part or share in"; "aeronautics" is defined as "the science
or art of aerial navigation". Applying these definitions to the clause in
question, the court was unable to determine whether its purpose was to
prohibit both active and passive sharetaking in "the science or art of
aerial navigation", or merely active sharetaking therein. But, under
either Interpretation, the court decided that a passenger in an airplane
was not "participating in aeronautics" any more than "the minister
of the gospel who rides the Twentieth Century Limited" is participating
in railroading, which is the science or art of rail navigation.
In reviewing the decisions in cases of this type, it is seen that
the courts have varied in their holdings.' There are two reasons for
this variance. First, the determination in each case depends upon the
definitions of words and what is meant by those definitions,2 and it is
the frailty of words that the same combinations of them will convey
different ideas to different individuals; and second, the advance of
aviation from the status of a hobby to that of a business This latter
factor is evident in the case under discussion, when the court compares
modern aviation to the business of railroading.
Two phrases, namely, "participating in aviation (or aeronautics)"
and "engaged in aviation (or aeronautics)" have been the most com-
monly used in Insurance policy "aircraft clauses."' From the very
first, the courts have held that a mere passenger is not "engaged in"
aviation or aeronautics As the court said in Benefit Ass'n of Railway
Em ployees v. Hayden:6
"Engaged in aeronautics . . . means active co-operation or
taking part in the aeronautical enterprise. ... "
I Reeder, Aircraft Clauses in Accident Policies, 65 U. S. L. Rev.
312 (1931); see also annotations in 69 A. L. R. 331.2 Airplan-e Passenger, 91 Ins. L. J. 918 (1938); Reeder, Aircraft
Clauses In Accident Policies, supra note 1.
Gregory et al. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 78 F. (2d) 522
(1935) ; Bayersdorfer v. Mass. Protective Ass'n., 20 F. Supp. 489 (1937) ;
it is suggested as a reason for the change in decisions in Reeder, Air-
craft Clauses In Accident Policies, supra note 1.
4Reeder, Aircraft Claieses It Accident Policies, supra note 1; (1931)
2 Air L. Rev. 77.
1 Gits v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 32 F. (2d) 7 (1929), certiorari denied
280 U. S. 564 (1929); Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees v. Hayden, 175
Ark. 565, 299 S. W. 995 (1927); Peters v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 233 N. Y. Supp. 500 (1929).
It Is to be noted that Masonic Ins. Co. v. Jackson, - Ind. App.
147 N. E. 156 (1925) held a passenger to be "engaged in" aviation, but
that case was superseded by Masonic Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 200 Ind. 472,
164 N. E. 628 (1929).
0 175 Ark. 565, 299 S. W. 995 (1927).
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The earlier holdings as to the "participating in" clauses, however,
held that a mere passenger came within their scope.' The attitude of
the courts at that time is well expressed in the following quotation
from Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Peake:8
"A passenger in an airplane flying in the air, whether he takes
part in the operation of the airplane or not, is "participating in
aeronautics" within the intent and meaning of provisions specifi-
cally exempting such risk from the indemnity contract contained
in the policy."
But the more recent decisions, of which the case under discussion
is illustrative, are holding that such a passenger is not "participating
in" aviation or aeronautics, and are allowing recovery for the death of
a passenger under such clauses, in the absence of any specific statement
exempting passengers from the terms of the policy?
The decision of the present case seems to be a just one. If insur-
ance companies wish to exempt passengers in airplanes from the opera-
tion of their policies, it is not unreasonable to require them to specifi-
cally provide therefor in the policy, and thereby inform the insured
exactly when he is not covered by the policy and enable him to avoid
the doing of acts which he might otherwise do.0
RIoHARD BuSi, J&
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peake, 82 Fla. 128, 89 So. 418 (1921); Mere-
dith v. Business Men's Accident Ass'n of America, 213 Mo. App. 688,
252 S. W. 976 (1923); Bew v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 95 N. J. Law 533,
112 Atl. 859 (1921).
682 Fla. 128, 89 So. 418 (1921).
Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 78 F. (2d) 522 (1935);
Bayersdorfer v. Mass. Protective Ass'n., 20 F. Supp. 489 (1937); Mis-
sQuri State Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 188 Ark. 907, 69 S. W. (2d) 1081
(1934). In the last cited case the court said: "The distinction thought
by the courts to exist between 'engage in aeronautics' and 'participa-
tion in aviation' may be apparent to, and approved by, those learned
in the niceties of the language and accustomed to its precise use; but
it is to be doubted whether those hair-splitting and subtle distinctions
would occur to, or be understood by, the majority of the thousands of
persons who seek insurance against the many hazards to life and
limb which are likely to occur to the most prudent and fortunate.
Words and phrases used in insurance policies should be construed by
their meaning as used in the ordinary speech of the people, and not as
understood by scholars."
Some courts have held that "engaged in" or "participating in",
without further explanation, creates an ambiguous clause which should
be strictly construed against the drawer, the insurer. See, Gits v.
N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 32 F. (2d) 7 (1929), certiorari denied, 280 U. S.
564 (1929); Masonic Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 200 Ind. 472, 164 N. E. 628
(1929); Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 Wis. 470, 232 N. W. 848
(1930).
10 In Bayersdorfer v. Mass. Protective Ass'n., 20 F. Supp. 489 (1937),
it is said: ". .. it is only fair that if they do not intend to include
such hazards that it should be made so clear that a person of ordinary
intelligence . . .will readily understand that such hazard is not
covered."
Many insurance companies are now using clauses which specifically
